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The new authoritarian regimes effectively cloak themselves in their constitutional-
looking clichés. These not only serve to legitimize dictatorial rule, for a time, but also
obscure paths forward to rebuild democracy and the rule of law. Hungary is currently
a model state for the relativization of the rule of law, using it as a political tool of
obfuscation.
With a view to the 2022 elections, there is a serious contradiction in Hungarian public
opinion: For one, there seems to be a consensus that a change of government will
not be enough, and that Hungary needs some kind of regime change, the abolition
of the NER (“System of National Cooperation” is the ideological self-designation
of the regime, see Kovács & Trencsényi (eds.), Brave New Hungary. Mapping the
“System of National Cooperation”). For another, there is no consensus on what a
small parliamentary majority (not two-thirds!) should do with the Basic Law. There
should be a regime change, but the Basic Law should not be touched – this will not
work.
Currently, the logic that a parliamentary majority makes the constitution with
the seats won after the election rules. Even bona fide ‘regime changers’ identify
constitution-making with parliamentary decision-making. Even with a two-thirds
majority, it is worth abandoning this logic. The alternative becomes clear if we look at
the current context, from which constraints arise: In any case, it is necessary to get
rid of the present constitution.
Neverending story?
At the moment, even with the persistence of a democratic opposition coalition, it is
doubtful that the Fidesz regime will end as a result of elections. Firstly, because of
the disproportionality of the electoral system, the monolithic political composition of
the electoral decision-making bodies and the presumed bias of the Curia (High Court
of Hungary). Secondly, because the propagandistic mode of the government media
system (partly public service media, partly owned by allies) is inherently a serious
handicap to non-pro-government arguments and reality. These are only two facets –
one could go on and on about what makes the fairness of elections illusory.
For now, let us concentrate on the other type of endlessness! The regime has
deliberately set itself up to reduce political elections to an irrelevant moment, so that
it need not fear losing power even if it loses the elections. This is the ultimate denial
of democracy: total disregard for the will of the electorate. A democratic coalition
government of the future, formed with a small majority, will be unable to govern
permanently, because the institutions and cadres of the once-governing Fidesz
will obstruct most of the essential government decisions and parliamentary laws
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by all means. No one can expect consensual logic and political neutrality from an
organization that has never exercised autonomy.
Those hoping for democratic governance must reckon with these obstacles. The
whole institutional setting of Hungary, from the Constitution to the election of the
President of the Curia, was built on the logic of not being able to govern for others.
Prime Minister Orbán has molded the public law system in his own image – it
cannot be run by anyone else. The regime has never hidden the fact that it was
playing a long game. It has calibrated the whole system and all its institutions,
from the Constitutional Court, the Media Council, the Hungarian National Bank,
the State Audit Office, the National Electoral Commission, the Attorney General to
the President of the Curia, precisely for this purpose. All public bodies that would
formally act as a constraint on the exercise of executive power in a constitutional
state are now the instruments and loyal support of the government. This political role
will act as a brake on any attempt at democratic governance after the elections. A
new government would soon be plunged into crisis and will unwittingly vindicate the
anti-democratic accusation that only the “national side” (Fidesz) is able to govern.
From there, there is little turning back. The solution is, of course, not to dismantle
the brakes, but to put in place a real system of public law, with brakes that are not
political in meaning, to replace an institutional system that has become totally one-
party. That is what regime change means.
Broken constitutionalism
The revised Basic Law of 2011 was not only corrupted by the shameful political
will of Fidesz to hold on to power, but also by the way it was drafted. The process
was nothing like democratic constitution-making; social debate, participation and
professional concepts did not cross the editorial mind of former MEP Szájer; the
disgraced politician once in charge of drafting. Before the 2010 elections, there
was no popular demand or electoral mandate for a new constitution. It was purely a
consequence of the two-thirds parliamentary majority. Since, the normative content
of the already incoherent, confused, ideologically-driven text has been completely
dismantled and reconstructed by repeated ad hoc amendments.
The 2011 Basic Law symbolically broke with the Hungarian republican tradition,
which was intertwined with the division of powers and their democratic exercise.
The proclamations of the republic (in 1848, 1918, 1946, and most relevantly 1989)
were rare democratic moments in Hungary, a victory for progressive and humane
forces in the fight against despotism. Their denial destroys the democratic identity
of Hungarian society. What is now essentially a one-party constitution creates an
exclusionary, false unity based on values that contradict the identity and hopes of
a modern European national community. The Basic Law openly breaks with the
principle of the neutral state, and ideologically constrains a social community and its
institutions, which are plural in many respects.
It is inconceivable that a new government with democratic intentions could or should
remain permanently faithful to such a fundamental law. The government would
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become discredited, if the Basic Law was not renounced. Likewise, how should it
bind judges in a democratic system?
Democratic arguments for a new constitution
In some cases, the year-long pursuit of exclusive power and the theft of public
funds raises questions of legal accountability. But whatever the new government
and the electorate may think about accountability of those who have committed
public political crimes, there will be no chance of progress without a change in the
constitution and the public law system. The weight of past injustice will weigh on new
democratic governance.
The creation of a new constitution would just be the first of many unravellings.
The new government will want to govern, and govern successfully. Therefore, it
will be forced to solve, trick, blackmail and reset the machinery of the system at a
lower level. This includes the political selection and replacement of staff in the state
administration and other shenanigans.
After a lost election, the Fidesz network of political and public institutions, from the
press to the constitutional judges, would inevitably claim that every governmental
and parliamentary decision to undo Fidesz’s rule is a violation of the rule of law and
constitutionalism. This not only makes governance and the necessary public law
reforms impossible, but also further destroys the culture of constitutionalism and
relativizes the acceptance of the rule of law.
The current and many previous Hungarian crises are caused, among other things,
by a lack of real participation. Even the breakdown of the Communist regime in
1989 did not alter this, and the involvement of society remained low. Today, this
sequence of events is remembered as a closed agreement between the elites. And
the unusually long democratic period in Hungarian history (1989-2010), according
to its critics, was synonymous with the rule of formal constitutional institutions. The
authoritarian populism of the Fidesz government was able to exploit this original flaw
after the regime change to the extreme, both to undermine the institutions of liberal
constitutionalism (the Constitutional Court, judicial independence, ombudsmen),
while removing all the checks and balances built into the government. These have
no value in populist regimes and their social acceptability cannot be established by a
clear declaration.
If we recognize the reasons that allowed the Republic of 1989 to fail, the
reconstruction of democracy cannot be that – a mere reconstruction. A programme
that seeks to restore the liberal rule of law with the weak democratic participation of
the pre-2010 period is doomed to failure. However disingenuous and exclusionary
the governmental appeal to the sovereignty of the national community against the
“foreign” (European) critics may have been, simply denying it cannot lead to results.
The familiar arguments of constitutional identity and national traditions have sought
to legitimize the dismantling of the institutions of the rule of law and human rights. A
simple formal institutional recovery now seems insufficient.
- 3 -
The rule of law and the institutions of liberal constitutionalism – in other words, the
system of constitutionally limited executive power – can only be reinstated with
greater democratic participation. It is therefore necessary to ensure the greatest
possible popular participation in the constitution-making process, not because
this might make up for the lack of legitimacy resulting from the likely absence of
a qualified parliamentary majority, but because this is the only way to stabilize a
constitutional democracy. The dismantling of an authoritarian regime requires a
“constitutional moment” (Ackerman, We the People), which must be revolutionary
in its constitutional content and democratic mode. However great the tension
between populism and constitutionalism, popular sovereignty is the ultimate source
of legitimacy. Populist politicians twist the meaning of popular sovereignty, making
it exclusionary, nationalist, ideologized and aligned with the institutional rule of the
parliamentary majority, the total power of government.
This ‘popular’ constitution-making moment must consist of at least three elements.
Firstly, the democratic opposition must make the intention and the method of
constitution-making part of the electoral programme, to be able to start preparing
this process in the absence of a two-thirds majority. Secondly, the text of a new
constitution, after proper preparation, must be legitimized by a referendum.
Thirdly (this is where we need to step out of our comfort zones), the best form of
preparation is to ensure that the constitutional dilemmas, the institutional solutions
– the actual process of constitution-making – is as open as possible, with the
widest possible participation. The fears that associate participation with ignorance,
partiality, prejudice and lack of constitutional culture must be overcome. After
proper professional and political preparation, civil society, interest groups and
local communities should negotiate the most important regulatory issues of the
constitution and build a broad consensus in an appropriately moderated framework.
It may not be possible to complete this process in a few months, but it will help
democratic governance and the fight against the remnants of the Orbán regime from
the very beginning. The painful problem of the absence of the rule of law can be
solved by the means of democracy.
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